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YODER'S LEGACY
Mark Strasser*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Wisconsin v. Yoder,' the United States Supreme Court held that a
Wisconsin compulsory school attendance law was unconstitutional as
applied to Amish parents who refused for religious reasons to allow their
children to attend high school. That decision has been subject to differing
interpretations, at least in part, because of its mixed messaging. In the very
same opinion, the Court offers language suggesting that the Constitution
provides robust protection of the implicated constitutional rights but also
suggests that the burden imposed on the state to justify overriding those
rights is not very great.2 Regrettably, Yoder's mixed messaging continues
to be represented in the caselaw. The rights implicated in Yoder are given
robust protection at certain times but not others without any
accompanying (plausible) explanation or justification. The Court thereby
only bolsters the impression that its decisions are unprincipled and its
holdings irreconcilable.
Part H1 of this Article discusses Yoder and some of the ways in which
the Court sent mixed messages with respect to the degree of protection
afforded to the implicated rights. Part III discusses the Court's
subsequent treatment of Yoder, where the Court sometimes takes Yoder to
stand for robust protections and at other times for deference to the state.4
This Article concludes that unless the Court takes its own avowed
principles and approaches more seriously, it will only continue to confuse
lower courts and undermine its own credibility.

*

Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio.

1. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
2. See id. at 234-35.
3.
4.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
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YODER

Wisconsin v. Yoder5 has been subject to differing interpretations, at
least in part, because of mixed messages about a variety of matters within
the opinion itself. The Yoder Court both affirmed and undercut the
strength of the implicated rights, which is regrettable because the Court
thereby reduced clarity both about which test was applicable when the
implicated rights were burdened by the state and about how the relevant
test should be applied. To make matters even more confusing, the Court
did not seem to appreciate that it was sending mixed messages, thereby
contributing to the incoherence of the underlying jurisprudence.
Yoder involved a Wisconsin law requiring children under sixteen
6
years of age to attend school unless certain exceptions applied. Some
Amish parents7 living in the state refused to send their children to high
school even though those children had not yet reached sixteen years of
age' and the statutory exceptions were inapplicable. 9 At issue was whether
federal constitutional guarantees precluded the state from forcing these

5. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
6.

Here is a portion of the underlying statute at issue:
118.15 Compulsory school attendance

(1)(a) Unless the child has a legal excuse or has graduated from high school,
any person having under his control a child who is between the ages of 7 and

16 years shall cause such child to attend school regularly during the full period
and hours, religious holidays excepted, that the public or private school in

which such child should be enrolled is in session until the end of the school
term, quarter or semester of the school year in which he becomes 16 years of

age.
(3) This section does not apply to any child who is not in proper physical or
mental condition to attend school, to any child exempted for good cause by the

school board of the district in which the child resides or to any child who has
completed the full 4-year high school course. The certificate of a reputable

physician in general practice shall be sufficient proof that a child is unable to
attend school.
(4) Instruction during the required period elsewhere than at school may be
substituted for school attendance. Such instruction must be approved by the
state superintendent as substantially equivalent to instruction given to children

of like ages in the public or private schools where such children reside.
Id. at 207 n.2 (providing the pertinent text of the applicable statute (citing Wis. Stat. § 118.15 (1969))).
7. Id. at 207 ("Respondents Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller .. . and respondent Adin
Yutzy . . .. declined to send their children, ages 14 and 15, to public school after they completed the
eighth grade.").
8. Id. ("Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law required them to cause their children
to attend public or private school until reaching age 16 but the respondents declined to send their

children, ages 14 and 15, to public school after they completed the eighth grade.").
9. Id. ("The children were not enrolled in any private school, or within any recognized
exception to the compulsory-attendance law .... ).
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parents to send their children to school when the parents' doing so would
have violated their sincere religious convictions.o
The Yoder Court recognized that two important individual interests
were at stake-the parents' right" to direct their children's education
established in Meyer v. Nebraska1 2 and Pierce v. Society of Sistersl3 and
the parents' right 4 to engage in the free exercise of religion established in
Sherbert v. Verner.15 The Court failed to make clear how much
significance to attach to the fact that two different rights were implicated.1 6
Much of the Court's analysis focused on the religious conflict posed by
the requirement, and the small part of the opinion discussing parental
rights seemed to undercut the strength of the protections
afforded thereto."
The Yoder plaintiffs did not want their children to attend public high
school because such high schools tend to promote values that are not
compatible with the Amish way of life. "The high school tends to
emphasize intellectual and scientific accomplishments, self-distinction,
competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other students."1 8
In contrast, "Amish society emphasizes informal learning-through-doing;
a life of 'goodness,' rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than
technical knowledge; community welfare, rather than competition; and
separation from, rather than integration with, contemporary
worldly society.""

10.

See id at 208-09.

11. Id. at 232-33 ("If not the first, perhaps the most significant statements of the Court in this
area are found in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, in which the Court observed: 'Under the doctrine

of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably
interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control."') (citations omitted).

12. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
13. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
14. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209 ("[R]espondents believed, in accordance with the tenets of Old
Order Amish communities generally, that their children's attendance at high school, public or private,

was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life. They believed that by sending their children to
high school, they would not only expose themselves to the danger of the censure of the church
community, but, as found by the county court, also endanger their own salvation and that of their

children. The State stipulated that respondents' religious beliefs were sincere.").
15. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
16. Cf Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233 ("And, when the interests of parenthood are combined with a
free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more than merely a 'reasonable relation to
some purpose within the competency of the State' is required to sustain the validity of the State's
requirement under the First Amendment.").
17. See id. at 213-19; infra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.

18. Yoder, 406 U.S. at2ll.
19. Id.
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An additional concern was that children of the relevant age (the
children were fourteen and fifteen) 20 who were at school would thereby
be "take[n] . . . away from their community, physically and emotionally,
during the crucial and formative adolescent period of life [d]uring
[which] .

..

the children must acquire Amish attitudes favoring manual

work and self-reliance and the specific skills needed to perform the adult
21
role of an Amish farmer or housewife." Perhaps because the children
would not develop the requisite attitudes, testimony suggested that
requiring Amish children to attend high school might "ultimately result in
the destruction of the Old Order Amish church community as it exists in
the United States today."2 2 The Court held that the state could not force
23
the parents to send their children to high school because "only those
interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can
24
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."
By suggesting that only interests of the highest order that could not
otherwise be promoted would justify overriding the free exercise of
religion, the Court implied that the Constitution's free exercise guarantees
alone sufficed to prevent the state from forcing these parents to contravene
25
their religious beliefs and send their children to high school. In addition,
the Court implied that free exercise guarantees are rather robust. The
Court stated that "[w]here fundamental claims of religious freedom are at
stake . . . we must searchingly examine the interests that the State seeks to
promote by its requirement for compulsory education to age 16, and the
impediment to those objectives that would flow from recognizing the
claimed Amish exemption."2 6 The Court then set out to apply the
announced standard to the case before it.

20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id

at 207.
at 211.
at 212.
at 234 ("[W]e hold, with the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, that the First and Fourteenth

Amendments prevent the State from compelling respondents to cause their children to attend formal

high school to age 16.").
24. Id.at215.
25. See id.
26. Id. at 221.
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The Court accepted2 the State's claims "that some degree of
education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and
intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom
and independence" 28 and that "education prepares individuals to be selfreliant and self-sufficient participants in society."29 But the Court rejected
the State's contention that no exception could be made for Amish
children, especially if those children were going to be living in the Amish
community:
It is one thing to say that compulsory education for a year or two beyond
the eighth grade may be necessary when its goal is the preparation of
the child for life in modem society as the majority live, but it is quite
another if the goal of education be viewed as the preparation of the
child for life in the separated agrarian community that is the keystone
of the Amish faith.30
Thus, because many of the Amish children would be living in their own
isolated community and because their attending high school would
undermine rather than promote their ability to thrive in that community,
the Court reasoned that these youths should be exempted from the state
requirement that they attend school until age sixteen.
What of the Amish children who might choose to live outside of the
separated agrarian community? 3 1 There was no "showing that upon
leaving the Amish community Amish children, with their practical
agricultural training and habits of industry and self-reliance, would
become burdens on society because of educational shortcomings." 32
Indeed, the Court noted "that the Amish have an excellent record as lawabiding and generally self-sufficient members of society."3 3 Thus, the
Court implied that Amish children would not be harmed by forgoing that
extra year or two of schooling, even if those children were not planning
on living in the Amish community.
Yet, if that is so, one might wonder whether non-Amish children
would be significantly benefited by the extra year or two of schooling. 34
The Court did not seem persuaded that the extra schooling was beneficial

27. Id. ("We accept these propositions.").
28. Id.
29. Id.
30.

Id. at 222 (citation omitted).

31. See id at 245 n.2 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) ("A significant number of Amish children
do leave the Old Order.").
32. Id. at 224.
33. Id. at 212-13.
34. Cf id. at 225 n. 13 ("[T]he defense introduced a study by Dr. Hostetler indicating that Amish
children in the eighth grade achieved comparably to non-Amish children in the basic skills.").
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as a general matter,35 although the Court's focus was on the lack of harm
that would be caused to Amish children in particular if those children were
exempted from the State's compulsory attendance requirement stating:
This case ... is not one in which any harm to the physical or mental
health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order, or welfare has
been demonstrated or may be properly inferred. The record is to the
contrary, and any reliance on that theory would find no support in the
evidence. 36

Indeed, the Court reaffirmed the power of the state to prevent harm
to children, stating: "To be sure, the power of the parent, even when linked
to a free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation under Prince if it
appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the
child, or have a potential for significant social burdens."3
Here, the Yoder Court implied that Prince v. Massachusetts
controlled, which suggests that Yoder is best understood as applying
41
Prince rather than as ignoring,39 limiting4 0 or contradicting Prince.

35. Cf id at 226 n.15 ("Even today, an eighth grade education fully satisfies the educational
requirements of at least six States.").
36. Id. at 230.
37. Id. at 233-34.
38. See Jonathan F. Will, My God My Choice: The Mature Minor Doctrine and Adolescent
Refusal of Life-Saving or Sustaining Medical Treatment Based Upon Religious Beliefs, 22 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 233, 249 n.92 (2006) ("The reasoning in both Princeand Yoder was
consistent, but the results varied due in large part to the different evidentiary records presented.").
39. See Nancy B. Shernow, Comment, Recognizing ConstitutionalRights of CustodialParents:
The Primacy of the Post-DivorceFamily in Child Custody Modification Proceedings, 35 UCLA L.
REV. 677, 688-89 (1988) ("In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court refused to apply its Prince holding to a
claim by Amish parents that their religious beliefs forbade them from sending their children to public
high school.").
40. See Lisa Biedrzycki, Comment, "Conformed to This World": A Challenge to the Continued
Justificationof the Wisconsin v. Yoder Education Exception in a ChangedOld OrderAmish Society,
79 TEMP. L. REV. 249, 260 (2006) ("[T]he Yoder Court distinguished its decision from Prince v.
Massachusetts, an earlier Supreme Court case, by removing the issue of child labor law."); Daniel N.
Price, Note, The Constitutional Standard for Zoning Cases Under the Texas Religious Freedom
RestorationAct, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 365, 378 (2002) ("The Yoder Court confined Prince to the
evils associated with child labor . . . ."); Benjamin L. Weiss, Note, Single Mothers' Equal Right to
Parent:A FourteenthAmendment DefenseAgainst Forced-LaborWelfare "Reform", 15 LAW & INEQ.
215, 233 (1997) ("The Court, however, narrowed the apparent breadth of Prince in Wisconsin
v. Yoder . . . ").
41. See Susan H. Bitensky, Spare the Rod, Embrace Our Humanity: Toward a New Legal
Regime Prohibiting CorporalPunishment of Children, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 468 (1998)
("[A]lthough in Wisconsin v. Yoder the Court upheld Amish parents' Free Exercise Clause
challenge, the Court took an entirely different view of the Free Exercise Clause claim of a child's
custodian in Prince v. Massachusetts.");Avigael N. Cymrot, Reading, Writing, and Radicalism: The
Limits on Government Control over Private Schooling in an Age of Terrorism, 37 ST. MARY'S L.J..
607, 659-60 (2006) ("[W]hile Yoder perhaps represents a high mark of the Court's deference to the
asserted free exercise rights of parents to provide their children with a religious education .... in

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol47/iss4/6
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Yet, Princeis not viewed as particularly protective of free exercise rights
as a general matter,42 or even of hybrid rights in particular.43
Understanding Yoder as applying Prince suggests that the common
understanding of those cases may be inaccurate-either Prince is more
protective of free exercise than is commonly thought,4 4 or Yoder may be
less protective than is commonly thought.4 5

Prince, the Court held that free exercise rights did not outweigh a state's interest in enforcing child

labor laws."); B. Jessie Hill, Whose Body? Whose Soul? Medical Decision-Making on Behalf of
Childrenandthe FreeExercise ClauseBefore andAfter Employment Division v. Smith, 32 CARDOZO

L. REV. 1857, 1863 (2011) ("[C]ourts often refer to Yoder's broad grant of parental rights in the same
breath that they note Prince's equally sweeping limitations on that right."); Jeffrey Shulman, What
Yoder Wrought: Religious Disparagement, ParentalAlienation and the Best Interests of the Child,

53 VILL. L. REV. 173, 186 (2008) ("In upholding a labor law that effectively prohibited children from
selling religious literature in public places, the Prince Court rejected the core principles that would

form Yoder 's doctrinal foundation.").
42.

See Donald L. Beschle, No More Tiers? Proportionalityas an Alternative to Multiple

Levels of Scrutiny in Individual Rights Cases, 38 PACE L. REV. 384, 422 (2018) ("[I]n Princev.
Massachusetts, the Court rejected a free exercise challenge to a statute prohibiting the use of children

in religious solicitations."); Megan Joy Rials, Comment, By the Pricking of My Thumbs, State
Restriction This Way Comes: Immunizing Vaccination Laws from ConstitutionalReview, 77 LA. L.
REV. 209, 232 (2016) ("Dicta from another Supreme Court case, Prince v. Massachusetts, suggests
that religious exemptions might not be required under the Free Exercise Clause."); Rebecca Williams,
Note, Faith HealingExceptions Versus Parens Patriae: Something's Gotta Give, 10 FIRST AMEND. L.
REV. 692, 710-11 (2012) ("The Supreme Court opinion in Princev. Massachusetts is viewed as the
seminal case in limiting the rights of parents to act upon their religion in ways that are harmful to
their children . . . ").

43. See David Gan-wing Cheng, Wisconsin v. Yoder: Respecting Children's Rights and Why
Yoder Should Be Overturned, 4 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 45, 62 (2013) ("[I]n Prince, the Court rejected
a Free Exercise and parental right challenge by a Jehovah's Witness to a state labor statute prohibiting
the furnishing of merchandise to a minor knowing he or she intends to sell it in a public place."); Josh

Gupta-Kagan, Stanley v. Illinois's Untold Story, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 773, 788-89 (2016)
("In 1944, the Princev. MassachusettsCourt had recognized some constitutional protections for
families-at least when those rights were bolstered by the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clausebut still upheld state intervention to protect children while applying fairly deferential review.");
William J. Haun, Comment, A Standardfor Salvation: Evaluating "Hybrid-Rights"Free-Exercise

Claims, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 265, 275 (2011) ("The Princecase, like Yoder, presented a hybrid claim
associated
with
raising
with
the
parental
rights
involving free exercise combined
children. Massachusetts labor laws prevented a mother from directing her children to distribute
religious literature in the streets. [T]he Court concluded that legitimate concerns regarding child
health and public safety could justify a state's constraints on that parental right."); Kelly R. Schwab,
Note, Lost Children: The Abuse and Neglect of Minors in Polygamous Communities of North
America, 16 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 315, 326-27 (2010) ("The controlling case
on Free Exercise and parenting during this period was Prince v. Massachusetts, a case that upheld a
law prohibiting children from distributing religious literature in the public sphere, despite parental

freedom to raise their children as they wish.").
44. But cf Henry J. Abraham, Abraham, Isaac and the State: Faith-Healing and Legal
Intervention, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 951, 974 (1993) ("[I]n light of Princev. Massachusetts,the
argument that, in the faith-healing context, free exercise is linked to fundamental parental rights, and
therefore, deserves the court's protection, is also apparently unpersuasive.").
45. See infra notes 63-75, 106-09 and accompanying text.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 6

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

1342

[Vol. 47:1335

Prince v. Massachusetts46 involved a Massachusetts law prohibiting
child labor.4 7 That law specified that any parent permitting a child to work
in violation of the law was subject to criminal penalty.4 8 Sarah Prince, who
was the "custodian of Betty M. Simmons, a girl nine years of age,"
permitted Betty to distribute the religious magazines Watchtower and
Consolationsoin exchange for donations." This practice was construed by
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to be sales falling within the
prohibition, 52 and the question before the United State Supreme Court was
whether federal guarantees precluded applying the Massachusetts statute
to Prince's conduct.53
Prince argued that her free exercise rights, coupled with her rights as
a parent, precluded the state from punishing her.54 After all, it was not as
if Prince left Simmons alone at night to distribute these religious tracts;
rather, the two were only about twenty feet apart55 when doing their
"preaching work." 56 Further, Prince was viewed by the Court as having
constitutionally protected rights by virtue of her relationship with
Simmons: "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor

46.
47.

321 U.S. 158 (1944).
Id. at 160-61 ("No boy under twelve and no girl under eighteen shall sell, expose or offer

for sale any newspapers, magazines, periodicals or any other articles of merchandise of any
description, or exercise the trade of bootblack or scavenger, or any other trade, in any street or public
place.").
48. Id at 161 ("Any parent, guardian or custodian having a minor under his control who
compels or permits such minor to work in violation of any provision of sections sixty to seventy-four,
inclusive . . . shall for a first offence be punished by a fine of not less than two nor more than ten
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than five days, or both.").

49. Id. at 159.
50. See id at 162.
51. Id. at 161 n.4 ("[S]pecified small sums are generally asked and received but the publications
may be had without the payment if so desired.").
52. See id. at 163 ("[T]he questions are no longer open whether what the child did was a 'sale'
or an 'offer to sell' within § 69 or was 'work' within § 81. The state court's decision has foreclosed
them adversely to appellant as a matter of state law." (citing Commonwealth v. Prince, 46 N.E.2d

755, 758 (Mass. 1943), affdsub nom. Princev. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944))).
53. See id at 160 (framing the issue as to "whether §§ 80 and 81, as applied, contravene the
Fourteenth Amendment by denying or abridging appellant's freedom of religion and by denying to
her the equal protection of the laws").

54. Id at 164 ("Appellant .... rests squarely on freedom of religion under the First
Amendment, applied by the Fourteenth to the states. She buttresses this foundation, however, with a
claim of parental right as secured by the due process clause of the latter Amendment.").
55. Id. at 162 ("[S]he and Mrs. Prince took positions about twenty feet apart near a street

intersection.").
56. Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol47/iss4/6
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hinder."57 However, the Prince Court explained, "neither rights of religion
nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation."
The Prince Court was fearful that those who engaged in unpopular
proselytizing, whether religious or otherwise, might be subject to physical
or verbal abuse. "The zealous though lawful exercise of the right to engage
in propagandizing the community, whether in religious, political or other
matters, may and at times does create situations difficult enough for adults
to cope with and wholly inappropriate for children, especially of tender
years, to face." 5 9 For example, there might be "emotional excitement and
psychological or physical injury." 60 Adults are permitted to risk such
injuries-"[p]arents may be free to become martyrs themselves." 6 1
However, parents are not permitted to subject their children to such risks
contrary to law-"it does not follow they [parents] are free, in identical
circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached
the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice
for themselves." 62
If indeed there was evidence in the record that children had been
subject to great harm when distributing religious literature, then the
differing holdings in Prince and Yoder would be unsurprising. Yet, the
showing of likely harm to Simmons was not particularly persuasive. The
Court cited to works describing the general dangers that are posed by child
labor. 63 But this case was different from the standard case involving child
labor if only because the child's guardian was present, which the Court
admitted would likely reduce the dangers posed. 4 Nonetheless, the
guardian's presence would not prevent individuals from being mean to
Betty Simmons,65 and the Court mentioned "harmful

57. Id. at 166.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 169-70.
60. Id. at 170.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 168 nn.15-16. But cf id at 174-75 (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("Reference is made in
the majority opinion to 'the crippling effects of child employment, more especially in public places,
and the possible harms arising from other activities subject to all the diverse influences of the street.'
To the extent that they flow from participation in ordinary commercial activities, these harms are
irrelevant to this case.").
64. See id. at 169 ("The case reduces itself therefore to the question whether the presence of the
child's guardian puts a limit to the state's power. That fact may lessen the likelihood that some evils
the legislation seeks to avert will occur.").

65.

Cf id. at 169-70 ("The zealous though lawful exercise of the right to engage in

propagandizing the community, whether in religious, political or other matters, may and at times does
create situations difficult enough for adults to cope with and wholly inappropriate for children,
especially of tender years, to face.").
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possibilities . . . [such as] emotional excitement and psychological or
physical injury." 6 6
Yet, the Court's point that there was a possibility of harm, while true,
proves too much. Mentioning such a possibility does not establish that
there was any evidence in the record indicating that harm was likely to
occur. 6 7 If the mere possibility of harm suffices to justify state
intervention, then state intervention would seem relatively easy to justify.
In his concurring and dissenting opinion,6 8 Justice Jackson articulated his
fear that the state could now justify a whole host of interventions with
respect to children's religious education and practice as long as the state
claimed to be doing so to promote health and welfare.69
Prince is helpful to consider when examining the Yoder Court's
repeated assertion that the Amish children would not be harmed by
forgoing that additional year or two of schooling.70 Prince suggests that
the mere possibility of harm should have sufficed,7 whereas the Yoder
Court's focus was on whether forgoing a year or two of schooling would,
in fact, have resulted in harm.72 But these differing emphases illustrate
just how malleable the suggested standard is. Given the lack of showing
73
the actual harm standard suggested in Yoder
of actual harm in Prince,
would seem to have yielded a favorable result for Prince, and the possible
harm standard suggested in Prince74 would presumably have yielded a
66. Id. at 170.
67. See id. at 174 (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("The state, in my opinion, has completely failed to
sustain its burden of proving the existence of any grave or immediate danger to any interest which it
may lawfully protect."); see also Brief for Appellant at 12, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944) (No. 98) ("There is nothing in the record to indicate that any of the evils the statute was
designed to prevent existed in this case. The record refutes any such contention.").
68. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 178 (Jackson, J., concurring and dissenting) ("I have no alternative
but to dissent from the grounds of affirmance of a judgment which I think was rightly decided.").
69. Id. at 177 ("[A] foundation is laid for any state intervention in the indoctrination and
participation of children in religion, provided it is done in the name of their health or welfare.").
70. Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Religion Is Not A Basis for Harming Others:

Review Essay of Paul A. Offit's Bad Faith: When Religious Belief Undermines Modern Medicine,
104 GEO. L.J. 1111, 1119 (2016) ("[I]t is crucial to note that Yoder is based on the Court's conclusion
that exempting these children from the schooling requirement was unlikely to harm them.") (book
review).

71.

See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972) ("To be sure, the power of the parent,

even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation under Prince if it appears that
parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant

social burdens.") (emphasis added).
72.

See id at 234 ("The record strongly indicates that accommodating the religious objections

.

of the Amish by forgoing one, or at most two, additional years of compulsory education will not
impair the physical or mental health of the child . .
73.
74.

See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
See supra note 71 and accompanying text. But see Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or.

v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,911 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Similarly, this Court's prior decisions
have not allowed a government to rely on mere speculation about potential harms, but have demanded
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10

Strasser: Yoder's Legacy

YODER'S LEGACY

2019]

1345

result favorable for the state in Yoder, assuming that missing one to two
years of school would at least potentially be harmful.
At least one other issue is raised by the Yoder analysis. Suppose that
several fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds do not wish to attend high school
because they have a strong (nonreligious) attachment to the land.7 6 They
(and their parents) believe that these teenagers would learn much more by
working on farms rather than by going to high school for one or two
additional years. Suppose further that these nonreligious parents and
children challenge the state's compulsory education requirement. In such
a case, the Court would have to decide whether these nonreligious
children would have to be afforded an exemption.
An important difference between Yoder and the hypothesized case is
that in the latter, the parents' free exercise interests would not be
implicated-the parents would (merely) be asserting their (fundamental)
right to direct their children's education. The challenge by these
nonreligious parents would likely not be successful. As the Court in Yoder
states, "A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be
interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is
based on purely secular considerations ....

evidentiary support for a refusal to allow a religious exception." (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind.

Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 719 (1981)); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 224-29; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 407 (1963))). However, Justice Blackmun did not consider whether Princeis best understood as
considering potential harms.

75.

See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 97 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[Tihis Court

has acknowledged that States have the authority to intervene to prevent harm to children. . . ." (citing

Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-34; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1944))); Yoder, 406 U.S.
at 230, 245 ("This case, of course, is not one in which any harm to the physical or mental health of
the child or to the public safety, peace, order, or welfare has been demonstrated or may be properly
inferred."); See also id (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) ("It is the future of the student, not the future

of the parents, that is imperiled by today's decision."); Nicholas J. Nelson, Note, A Textual Approach
to Harmonizing Sherbert and Smith on Free Exercise Accommodations, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.

801, 825 (2008) ("Parents also often make religiously motivated choices on behalf of their children-such as not sending them to high school, as in Yoder-that could be said to 'harm' them."); cf Emily
A. Bishop, Note, A Child's Expertise: EstablishingStatutory Protectionfor IntersexedChildren Who

Reject Their Gender of Assignment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 531, 561 (2007) ("Prince essentially
establishes harm as a limiting principle on the broad language of Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder: To the
extent that parental choices cause harm to a child, they do not receive constitutional protection.").
76. Cf supranotes 34-35 and accompanying text.

77.

Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
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The Court illustrated what it would have considered a merely
secular consideration:
[I]f the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective
evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by
the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and
isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a
basis
religious
than religious.78

[but

would

be] .

. ..

philosophical..

.

rather

The Court's point should not be misunderstood. The fact that the
values at issue were religious rather than merely "philosophical and
personal" 79 did not end the analysis, because "activities of individuals,
even when religiously based, are often subject to regulation by the States
in the exercise of their undoubted power to promote the health, safety, and
general welfare."so That said, however, the Amish parents' decision not
to send their child to high school had to be respected because free exercise
interests were implicated, whereas parents who could show that their
children would not be harmed by doing something other than attending
high school for one or two years would nonetheless not be able to have
their children exempted absent some free exercise claim.'
The Yoder Court's position with respect to the degree to which
parenting rights are protected is somewhat difficult to understand. Citing
both Meyer and Pierce,82 the Yoder Court acknowledged that the parent's
right to educate his or her child has a long pedigree. The Court discussed
the "traditional concepts of parental control over the religious upbringing
and education of their minor children recognized in this Court's past
decisions."8 3 Not only does "[t]he history and culture of Western
civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture
and upbringing of their children[,]" 84 but the "primary role of the parents
in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an
85
enduring American tradition."

78. Id. at 216.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 220.
81. See id. at 236 ("Nothing we hold is intended to undermine the general applicability of the
State's compulsory school-attendance statutes or to limit the power of the State to promulgate
reasonable standards .... ).
82. See id. at 232-33.
83. Id. at 231.
84. Id. at 232.
85. Id.
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After implying that this long-recognized parental right had robust
protection, the Court undercut the strength of that very protection. First,
the Court quoted the following passage from Pierce:
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, we think it
entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education
of children under their control. . . . [The] rights guaranteed by the

Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable
relation to some purpose within the competency of the State.86

'

Here, the Court suggests that the parents' liberty to direct their
children's education cannot be overridden by legislation that is not
reasonably related to legitimate state purposes.87 Such a point, while true,
does not establish that the implicated parental right is particularly robust
because all legislation must be rationally related to a legitimate state
objective to pass constitutional muster.
If Meyer and Pierce really involve the fundamental interest in
parenting, then one might assume that the Yoder Court was understating
the relevant state burden and that the state had to do more than merely
establish that its legislation was rationally related to a legitimate state
interest in order to override parental rights.9 0 But the Yoder Court
implicitly rejected that it was understating the relevant state burden when
describing Pierce's requirement that legislation (merely) have some
reasonable relation to a legitimate state purpose.9
The Yoder Court distinguished what was at issue before it from what
had been at issue in Pierce by noting that "when the interests of
parenthood are combinedwith a free exercise claim of the nature revealed
by this record, more than merely a 'reasonable relation to some purpose
within the competency of the State' is required to sustain the validity of

86. Id. at 232-33 (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)).
87. See id. at 233.
88. See U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 183 (1980) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("A
legislative classification may
legitimate state purpose.").

89.

be

upheld

only

if

it

bears

a

rational

relationship to a

See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997) ("The [Due Process] Clause

also provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights
and liberty interests . . . . [which] . . . includes the right[] . . . to direct the education and upbringing

of one's children.") (citing, inter alia, Pierce,268 U.S. 510; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
90. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) (discussing the "line of cases which
interprets the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantee of 'due process of law' to include a
substantive component, which forbids the government to infringe certain 'fundamental' liberty
interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest.").

91.

See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232-33.
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Such a comment suggests that when free
the State's requirement. . .
exercise interests are not also at issue, then the interests of parenthood are
permissibly overridden as long as there is a reasonable relationship
between the state regulation and a legitimate purpose. The parenting right
standing alone must give way to the state's compulsory education
requirement-"A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not
be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it
"193
is based on purely secular considerations ....
Yet, this is surprising. Suppose that nonreligious children would
suffer no harm by forgoing the extra year or two of schooling (perhaps the
same arguments supplied by the Amish94 could analogously be offered
here). Then, it is not clear what compelling state interest would justify
overriding the parents' fundamental right to determine the education of
their children (by having the children forgo the extra year or two of school,
which ex hypothesi would not be harmful). But if the parents' decisions
regarding their children's education can be overridden, absence of harm
notwithstanding, then Yoder suggests that the parents' right to direct their
children's education is not particularly robust.
Yoder is rather confusing. It mentions that two important rights are
implicated, but suggests that the parent's right to direct his or her child's
education is not very robust. In addition, the Court sends mixed messages
about the degree to which free exercise rights are robust. The Court
suggests both that free exercise rights alone are afforded significant
constitutional protection and that free exercise rights-only when coupled
with other important rights-are afforded significant constitutional
protection. As if that were not confusing enough, the Court also suggests
that free exercise rights, when coupled with other important rights; can
nonetheless be overridden upon some showing of probable
(possible?) harm.
III.

YODER IN THE CASELAW

The Yoder Court's confusing messages are reflected in the
subsequent caselaw. Sometimes, parental rights are characterized as
robust, but at other times are characterized as readily overridden.
Sometimes, free exercise rights are characterized as strongly protected,
whereas at other times they are characterized as strongly protected only
when coupled with other important rights, and still, at other times, they
are characterized as relatively weak. The Court's shifting standards
92. Id. at 233 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 215.
94. See supra notes 34-35, 71, 74.
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coupled with its reaching very different results when allegedly applying
the same standard in apparently relatively similar circumstances have
undermined confidence in the consistency of the jurisprudence9 5 and the
integrity of the Court.96
A.

EducationRights

The Yoder Court's ambiguous messaging about the robustness of
parenting rights is reflected in the later caselaw. For example, citing
Yoder, the Court in Lassiter v. DepartmentofSocial Services` said that it
"has accorded a high degree of constitutional respect to a natural parent's
interest ... in controlling the details of the child's upbringing,"9 8 and
elsewhere claimed that parent-child relationships are shielded from
state interference. 99

95.

Cf Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 731 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part) ("The Court simply cannot, consistent with its precedents, distinguish this case
from the wide variety of factual situations in which the Free Exercise Clause indisputably imposes
significant constraints upon government."); John W. Whitehead, The Conservative Supreme Court
and the Demise ofthe Free Exercise ofReligion, 7 TEMP. POL. & C.R.L. REV. 1, 1 (1997) ("A survey
of the United States Supreme Court's Free Exercise Clause decisions reveals that the Court has not
maintained a consistent free exercise jurisprudence."); Ernest P. Fronzuto, III, Comment, An
Endorsementfor the Test of GeneralApplicability: Smith II, Justice Scalia, and the Conflict Between
Neutral Laws and the Free Exercise of Religion, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 713, 717 (1996)
(discussing "the contradictory approaches to free exercise review presented by the Court and
Congress, and their inconsistent application").

96.

See Donald Falk, Note, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association:

Bulldozing FirstAmendment ProtectionofIndian SacredLands, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 515, 553 (1989)
("Northwest Indian injured more than the protections of the free exercise clause. The opinion
compromised the integrity of the Court's judicial method of reviewing and representing facts.");
Michelle L. Stuart, Note, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993: Restoring Religious
Freedom After the Destruction of the Free Exercise Clause, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 383, 408 (1994)

("The new majority position destroys the Free Exercise Clause by distorting prior case law, an
approach that can be fatal to other constitutional guarantees and to the integrity of the Court.").

97. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
98. Id. at 38-39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232-34; Pierce v. Soc'y
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)).
99. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 446 (1990) ("[T]he family has a privacy interest in
the upbringing and education of children and the intimacies of the marital relationship which is
protected by the Constitution against undue state interference." (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-34));

Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 599 (1984) ("Among the relationships that we have expressly
shielded from state interference are bonds .. .between parents and their children." (citing Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972))).
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Yet, the Court has also cited Yoder when attempting to undermine
the robustness of the parenting claim at issue. For example, in Runyon v.
McCrary,' the Court wrote:
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, the Court stressed the limited scope
of Pierce, pointing out that it lent "no support to the contention that
parents may replace state educational requirements with their own
idiosyncratic views of what knowledge a child needs to be a productive
and happy member of society" but rather "held simply that while a State
may posit [educational] standards, it may not pre-empt the educational
101
process by requiring children to attend public schools."
The Runyon Court suggests that Yoder undercuts the strength of
parental rights. The difficulty is not that the Court is cautioning that
1 02
parental rights are not absolute. That goes without saying, because no
rights are absolute. 0 ' But if Pierce and Yoder are merely understood as
04
precluding the state from prohibiting attendance at private schools that
are subject to reasonable regulation,' then Pierce and Yoder are not
offering particularly strong protection and seem to belie that there is a
fundamental interest in directing one's children's education.
B.

Free Exercise

Some of the language in Yoder suggests that free exercise rights are
afforded robust protection while other language in the opinion suggests
that free exercise rights will be afforded robust protection only when
another right is also implicated.10 6 While commentators agree that Yoder
stands for the proposition that, once triggered, free exercise rights must
be afforded robust protection, 0 7 the caselaw is less supportive of that
100. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
101. Id. at 177 (White, J., concurring) (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 239); see also Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 461 (1973) (discussing the limitations of the protections recognized in Pierce
and Yoder).
102. Cf Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 92-93 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[N]o one
believes [that] . . . parental rights are to be absolute.").

103. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 802 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("No
fundamental right . . . is absolute."); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85 (1949) ("[E]ven
the fundamental rights of the Bill of Rights are not absolute.").
104. See Runyon, 427 U.S. at 177.
105. Id. at 178-79 ("The Court has repeatedly stressed that while parents have a constitutional
right to send their children to private schools and a constitutional right to select private schools that
offer specialized instruction, they have no constitutional right to provide their children with private
school education unfettered by reasonable government regulation.").
106. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).
107. See Michael A. Helfand, Religious Institutionalism, Implied Consent, and the Value of
Voluntarism, 88 S. CAL. L. REv. 539, 557-58 (2015) ("[B]oth the Sherbert and Yoder courts afforded
broad protection to religiously motivated conduct against the substantial burdens imposed by
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conclusion than is commonly thought. Thus, language from Yoder
supports the proposition that the Constitution offers strong protection for
free exercise rights. The Court stated, "[w]here fundamental claims of
religious freedom are at stake . . [the Court] must searchingly examine
the interests that the State seeks to promote."' 08 The Court also supported
the proposition that free exercise rights, when coupled with other rights,
will be offered robust protection-"when the interests of parenthood are
combined with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record,
more than merely a 'reasonable relation to some purpose within the
competency of the State' is required to sustain the validity of the State's
requirement under the First Amendment."109 But the Court also offers
language to support the proposition that the state has the power to override
free exercise rights when the failure to do so might cause harm-"the
power of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be
subject to limitation . .. if it appears that parental decisions will

jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for
significant social burdens." 10 Yet, a case that provides support for such
differing approaches to free exercise cannot plausibly be thought to
represent the epitome of free exercise protection"' unless one believes
that free exercise protections are not very strong.
The difficulty pointed to here is not merely that the Court's meaning
is ambiguous. Decisions that are written in a confusing way can be
clarified in the subsequent jurisprudence. For example, both Stanley v.

.

otherwise valid laws-insisting that such religiously motivated conduct was guaranteed free exercise
protections save in the most extreme of circumstances."); Douglas Laycock, Church Autonomy
Revisited, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 253, 256 (2009) ("The law of conscientious objection was also
at a high point in 1981. Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder required compelling justification
for governmentally imposed burdens on the free exercise of religion . . . ."); Richard S. Myers, The
Right to Conscience and the First Amendment, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 123, 127 (2010)
(acknowledging that "Yoder is viewed as the high watermark of free exercise protection" but then in
the same breath asserting "the ruling [Yoder] was in reality quite narrow."); Elizabeth HarmerDionne, Note, Once A Peculiar People: Cognitive Dissonance and the Suppression of Mormon
Polygamy As A Case Study Negating the Belief-Action Distinction, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1295, 1304
(1998) ("The decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder marked the pinnacle of judicial recognition
of free exercise exemptions."); Marie Killmond, Note, Why Is Vaccination Diferent? A Comparative
Analysis of Religious Exemptions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 913, 921 (2017) ("Two midcentury
cases, Wisconsin v. Yoder and Sherbert v. Verner, are often viewed jointly as the high-water mark of
free exercise protection. . . ."); Cynthia Koploy, Note, Free Exorcise Clause? Whether Exorcism Can
Survive the Supreme Court's "Smith Neutrality", 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 363, 375 (2010) ("[C]ases like
marked
the height
and Burger Courts
Warren
the
Sherbert and Yoder under
of free exercise protection for religious actors . .
108. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221.
109. See id at 233 (internal citation omitted).
110. See id at 233-34.
111. See supranote 107 and accompanying text.
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13
Illinoisl12 and Zablocki v. Redhail were decided on equal protection
grounds 1 14 but have subsequently been understood to protect fundamental
1
interests under substantive due process. s The difficulty is that
subsequent caselaw has cited Yoder to support very different approaches
to free exercise jurisprudence.1 16
In several cases, the Court has quoted with approval the language in
11 7
Yoder suggesting that free exercise rights have robust protection.
However, writing for the majority, Justice Scalia in Employment Division,
18
Department ofHuman Resources of Oregon v. Smith' suggested:

The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars
application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously
motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but
the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections, such as ... the right of parents, acknowledged in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), to direct the education of their
children.1 1 9

A number of points might be made about the Smith Court's
characterization of Yoder. First, the Yoder Court itself noted that two
rights were implicated, 120 so it was not as if the Smith Court had
112.
113.

405 U.S. 645 (1972).
434 U.S. 374 (1978).

114.

See id. at 382 ("[T]he statute violates the Equal Protection Clause."); Stanley, 405 U.S. at

658 ("[D]enying such a hearing to Stanley and those like him while granting it to other Illinois parents
is inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection Clause.").

115.

See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.

57, 66 (2000) ("[W]e have recognized the

fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their

children." (citing Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651)); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) ("[T]he decision
to marry is a fundamental right under Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) .... ).
116.

The claim here is not that this is the only case to have this chimerical quality. See generally

Mark P. Strasser, Rust in the FirstAmendment Scaffolding, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 861, 861-87 (2017)
(discussing the recurring, differing interpretations of Rust v. Sullivan in the caselaw).

117.

See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 627-28 (1978) ("The Court recently declared in

Wisconsin v. Yoder . . . '[t]he essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only
those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims

to the free exercise of religion."'); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 81 (1985) ("Our cases
have interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to compel the government to exempt persons from some
generally applicable government requirements so as to permit those persons to freely exercise their

religion." (citing, inter alia, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972))); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind.
Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) ("The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by
showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest. However, it
is still true that '[t]he essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those
interests of the highest order . . . can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."'

(citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215)) (omission in original).
118. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
119. Id. at 881 (citing, inter alia, Yoder, 406 U.S. 205) (internal citations omitted).
120. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233 (noting that "the interests of parenthood are combined with a
free exercise claim").
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discovered something altogether new. 12 1 That said, however, Smith likely
neither accurately reflects Yoder nor the traditional jurisprudence.
Yoder suggests that free exercise rights alone provide a bulwark
against state intervention-"only those interests of the highest order and
those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free
exercise of religion."1 2 2 Unless one believes that the Yoder Court was
simply confused, it seems unlikely that the Court would say in one part of
the opinion that free exercise rights alone impose an additional burden on
the government, 12 3 but in a different part of the opinion that free exercise
imposes an additional burden on the government only when other rights
are also implicated. Instead, the more plausible interpretation of the Yoder
Court's having discussed the robustness of free exercise rights and also
having noted elsewhere that parenting rights were at issue is that the Court
was suggesting that the parenting right alone would not have justified
granting the exemption but that the parenting right combined with a free
exercise right would. 12 4 The Court thereby undercuts the strength of the
parenting right, 125 but need not be suggesting that free exercise rights are
only protected when another right is also implicated.
As Justice O'Connor pointed out in her Smith concurrence in the
judgment, one issue involves whether a statute's burdening free exercise
rights will trigger strict scrutiny, and a different issue is whether the statute
will ultimately be upheld.1 2 6 Even when strict scrutiny is triggered, the
state law will be upheld if there is a sufficiently compelling interest and
sufficiently narrow tailoring. 12 7 Justice O'Connor claimed that in each of
the free exercise cases in which the Court upheld the classification at
issue, the Court "rejected the particular constitutional claims ... only
after carefully weighing the competing interests." 2 8
Precisely because a law's triggering strict scrutiny will not guarantee
that the law will be struck down, one cannot merely look at the success of
121. Some commentators seem not to appreciate this. See, e.g., Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants
to Stop'the Church:Homosexual Rights Legislation, Public Policy, andReligiousFreedom, 69 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 393, 430 (1994) ("Exactly what is this new invention of Justice Scalia and the majority

in Smith?").
122. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
123. See also id. at 220 ("A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless
offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens

the free exercise of religion." (citing, inter alia, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963))).
.

124. See id. at 215 ("A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a
barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular considerations . .
125. Cf supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.

126.

See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 903-07 (1990)

(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).

127.
128.

See id. at 896.
Id.
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the underlying claim to determine whether the free exercise right, standing
12 9
The Smith Court
alone, had triggered a higher level of scrutiny.
existing at that
jurisprudence
exercise
free
the
inaccurately characterized
presence of
the
required
time in that free exercise rights had never before
130
an additional right in order to trigger closer review.
That said, however, Smith captures something important that Justice
O'Connor's comments miss.1 3' While Justice O'Connor was correct that
there is no necessary connection between the level of scrutiny employed
and the ultimate holding, it is nonetheless true that few laws will pass
muster under strict scrutiny, 13 2 because "such classifications are
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further
compelling governmental interests." 3 3 In several of the cases implicating
free exercise, the Court upheld the classification even though the ends did
not seem compelling or the means did not seem narrowly tailored to
13 4
promote the state's implicated interest. For example, Justice Brennan
1 35
described the state interest implicated in Braunfeld v. Brown that
allegedly justified overriding the free exercise interests of those observing
Sabbath on a day other than Sunday as "the mere convenience of having
everyone rest on the same day." 1 3 6 Justice Stevens described the state
interest allegedly justifying overriding the free exercise interests of the
Amish who wished not to participate in the Social Security system as
13 7
insufficiently strong in United States v. Lee. He noted that "it would be

129.

See id. at 897 ("[I]t is surely unusual to judge the vitality of a constitutional doctrine by

looking to the win-loss record of the plaintiffs who happen to come before us.").

130.

See id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("In short, [the Court] effectuates a wholesale

overturning of settled law concerning the Religion Clauses of our Constitution."); see also Holt v.

Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015) ("Smith largely repudiated the method of analysis used in prior
free exercise cases like Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963)."); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760 (2014) ("[T]his Court's
decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
[sic], . . . largely repudiated the method of analyzing free-exercise claims that had been used in cases

like Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)."); Haun,
supra note 43, at 282 (discussing "the vast change that Smith brought to free-exercise law").
131. See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
132. Cameron Schlagel, Note, Avoiding the Second Amendment Scrutiny Quagmire: A
Pragmatic Testfor Second Amendment Challenges Based on International Evidence, 40 LOY. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 223, 251 (2017) ("[L]aws reviewed under strict scrutiny are presumptively
unconstitutional and rarely upheld.").

133.

See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).

134. See generally Mark Strasser, The Protection of Conscience: On ACA, RFRA and Free
Exercise Guarantees, 82 TENN. L. REV. 345 (2015) (discussing various cases in which the Court
upheld laws adversely affecting free exercise where it was not plausible to believe that the laws passed
muster under strict scrutiny).

135.
136.
137.

366 U.S. 599, 614 (1961) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id.
455 U.S. 252, 262 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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a relatively simple matter to extend the exemption to the taxes involved
in this case[,]"13 and admitted that "if we confine the analysis to the
Government's interest in rejecting the particular claim to an exemption at
stake in this case, the constitutional standard as formulated by the Court
has not been met."1 39
To make matters even more confusing, a plurality announced a new
standard in Bowen v. Roy,1 4 0 arguing that the Yoder test "is not appropriate
in [a] setting. ... [involving] the enforcement of a facially neutral and
uniformly applicable requirement for the administration of welfare
programs reaching many millions of people."1 4 1 There, "the Government
is entitled to wide latitude." 14 2 Instead, "[a]bsent proof of an intent to
discriminate against particular religious beliefs or against religion in
general, the Government meets its burden when it demonstrates that a
challenged requirement for governmental benefits, neutral and uniform in
its application, is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public
interest."l 43 Then, the Court reversed course, rejecting the Bowen standard
the very next year.
In Yoder, even the free exercise right coupled with the parenting right
would not have won the day against the compulsory attendance
requirement had there been any evidence that failing to have the additional
years of schooling would have harmed the children in some way. 145 But if
a mere showing of probable harm is enough to defeat free exercise rights,
then those rights are not particularly robust. Suppose that it can be shown
that fasting can cause harm1 4 6 or that drinking sacramental wine can be
harmful.1 47 If this is all that Yoder requires in order for free exercise rights
to be overridden, then the case does not seem to offer the robust protection
that is sometimes claimed.

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id.
476 U.S. 693 (1986).
Id at 707.
Id
Id at 707-08.
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987).
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972) ("This case, of course, is not one in

which any harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order, or
welfare has been demonstrated or may be properly inferred.").

146.

Cf Robert K. Vischer, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Rethinking the Value of

Associations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 949, 1007 n.205 (2004) (noting that fasting can threaten

health).
147.

Cf Garrett Epps, What We Talk About When We Talk About Free Exercise, 30 ARIZ. ST.

L.J. 563, 579 (1998) ("The alcohol in the wine does pose a health threat to those who have legitimate
access to enough of it to experience ill effects.").
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CONCLUSION

Yoder is sometimes characterized as establishing that free exercise
and parenting rights receive robust constitutional protection. But an
examination of the reasoning and holding of the case suggests that it sends
contradictory messages about the strength of those rights. Sometimes, the
Court speaks in glowing terms about these very important rights and at
other times suggests that the state can override these rights relatively
easily.
The Court's contradictory messaging continues to be represented in
the caselaw in that Yoder is sometimes cited to support the proposition
that free exercise or parenting rights are robust while at other times is cited
to establish that the burden imposed on the state to justify overriding these
rights is not particularly onerous. Certainly, this is not the only case that
operates in this way. Prince (which the Yoder Court suggested was
controlling) is also sometimes cited to establish the robustness of parental
rightsl4 8 and also cited to establish that parental rights (and free exercise
49
rights as well) must give way to the state's interest in preventing harm.'
At least one difficulty posed by Yoder's mixed messaging is that it
undercuts that the case really stands for anything. If one wishes to suggest
that the state must bear a heavy burden when overriding free exercise
rights, one can cite to Yoder and its language suggesting the robustness of
free exercise. If one wishes to suggest that the state does not have to bear
a heavy burden in order to override free exercise rights, one can cite to
Yoder and its language suggesting that the state can override free exercise
rights to prevent harm. But Yoder then seems to permit the Court to protect
those free exercise rights of which it approves (because the state allegedly
must bear a heavy burden before it can justifiably override those rights)
and to permit the state to override those free exercise rights of which the
Court does not approve (because the state is justified in overriding free
exercise right on any showing of probable or, perhaps, possible harm).
But the Court's citing Yoder to justify these differing approaches to free
exercise undercuts the perception that the Court is principled and that the
standards announced by the Court are being applied in good faith. Neither
the Court nor society can afford to have such perceptions promoted and

148. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 38 (1981) ("[F]reedom of personal choice
in matters of family life long has been viewed as a fundamental liberty interest worthy of protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment." (citing, inter alia, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166

(1944))).
149. See H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S.

398, 449

(1981)

(Marshall, J., dissenting)

("Parental authority is never absolute, and has been denied legal protection when its exercise threatens

the health or safety of the minor children." (citing Prince, 321 U.S. at 169-70)).
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the Court must do its utmost to correct its ill-advised haphazard approach
to the enforcement of important rights.
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